We model the impact of the transfer price rule (a constraint that requires the downstream division of a vertically-integrated …rm to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the counterfactual case that it pays the same price as a nonintegrated …rm for the essential input), rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Linkline, for the performance of markets in which an upstream …rm provides an essential input to a downstream …rm with which it may compete in the retail market by vertical integration. We allow for horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation in the …nal good market. The upstream …rm's equilibrium distribution choice (between exclusion, dual distribution, or nonintegration) depends on relative product qualities. We characterize conditions under which the transfer price rule alters the upstream …rm's equilibrium distribution choice, and develop conditions for the transfer price rule to improve market performance.
Introduction
The question of the appropriate antitrust treatment of a vertical price squeeze (Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp, 2009, p. 273) , . . . when a vertically integrated …rm "squeezes" a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival and a low output price to consumers for whom the two …rms compete, is a hoary one, 1 central to recent U.S. antitrust 2 and EU competition policy 3 cases. Many of these cases arise out of the interaction between downstream …rms that supply internet access to …nal consumers, using as an essential input the upstream telecommunications infrastructure of vertically-integrated …rms with which they compete in the downstream market.
The U.S. Linkline 4 decision involved just such vertical relationships, between four California internet service providers (ISPs) of retail DSL (digital subscriber line) internet access, using wholesale transmission services purchased from Paci…c Bell Telephone Co. (later, and in what follows, AT&T), which itself provided retail DSL internet access. 5 In July, 2003, the ISPs …led a private antitrust suit alleging that AT&T had monopolized and attempted to monopolize the regional DSL market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (503 F. 3d 876 at 878), among other things by "creat[ing] a price squeeze by charging ISP a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which defendants were providing retail services."
AT&T sought dismissal in District Court on the ground that since it had no obligation under the antitrust laws to deal with the ISPs at all, it could not have monopolized in violation of the Sherman Act if its prices did not permit them a normal rate of return on investment. The District Court did not accept this argument, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse the District Court, and AT&T appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the resulting decision, the Supreme Court declined to treat "price squeeze" as a distinct business strategy for antitrust purposes, instead decomposing it 1 Early U.S. antitrust decisions in which price squeezes were at issue include U. S. v. Corn Products Re…ning Co. et al. 234 F. 964 (1916) and U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America et al. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945 ); on the latter, see Sidak (2008, p. 283, pp. 303-304) and Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp (2009) . 2 Among which, ARCO (Atlantic Rich…eld Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) ) and Weyerhaeuser (Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 549 U. S. 312 (2007) ). Sidak (2008, Section II.A) reviews U.S. price-squeeze decisions arising in the telecommunications sector. 3 For example, Telefónica (Case COMP/38.784 -Wanadoo España v. Telefónica Commission Decision of 4 July 2007) and Wanadoo (France Télécom SA v Commission Case C-202/07 2 April 2009). See Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003) , Bravo and Siciliani (2007) for discussions. 4 Paci…c Bell Telephone Co. et al. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., et al. 555 U. S. ____ (2009) . 5 The Linkline decisions treated DSL internet access as the relevant product market. At this time and in this geographic market, DSL, dial-up, and cable modem were alternatives available to …nal consumers. The outcomes of these decisions did not, however, turn on the question of product market de…nition. into two parts, each of which could be treated according to existing antitrust standards. First, the high wholesale price that is the lower prong of a price squeeze is an exercise of monopoly power, which for antitrust economics is the ability to control price or exclude competition. The exercise of lawfully obtained market power does not o¤end U.S. antitrust law (in particular, the Sherman Act Section 2 prohibition of monopolization). 6 Second, the low retail price that is the upper prong of a price squeeze is monopolization if it is predatory, otherwise not. 7 Along the way to sending the case back to District Court for further proceedings consistent with its guidance, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reject application of the "transfer price rule"approach to vertical price squeezes, an approach suggested by the American Antitrust Institute in a friend-of-thecourt brief. 8 The transfer price test would …nd monopolization if (555 U. S. ____ 14) the upstream monopolist could not have made a pro…t by selling at its retail rates if it purchased inputs at its own wholesale rates.
When it rejected use of the transfer price test, the Supreme Court did so without analysis of its impact on retail market performance, simply stating (555 U. S. ____ 14): 9 Whether or not that test is administrable, it lacks any grounding in our antitrust jurisprudence. An upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it would like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from charging monopoly prices. 6 It is otherwise for EU competition policy: under Article 102 of the EU Treaty, the mere exercise of market power is in principle an abuse of a dominant position. 7 Under, inter alia, Brooke Group, a price is predatory if it is below an appropriate measure of unit cost and if the …rm charging the price would have an objectively reasonable expectation of recouping pro…ts lost while setting a predatory price. EU competition policy takes demonstration of a price below unit cost as establishing that a …rm expected to be able to recoup predatory losses; no separate demonstration of recoupment is required to …nd that a price below unit cost abuses a dominant position (Tetra Pak II (Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission 1996 ECR I-5951) { 44, Wanadoo.) 8 One author of this paper is a member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute. He was not involved in any way in preparation of the aforementioned brief. 9 The European Commission has applied the transfer price rule, although not by that name. See Motta and de Streel's (2006, pp. 118-120) discussion of British Sugar (Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 , Napier Brown-British Sugar, OJ L 284 [1988 ; quoting { 66 of the Commission decision, "A company which is dominant in the market for both a raw material and a corresponding derived product may not maintain a margin between both prices which is insu¢ cient to re ‡ect that dominant company's own costs of transformation with the result that competition in the derived product is restricted") and Deutsche Telekom (Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 , Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263 [2003 , quoting { 107 of the Commission decision, "there is an abusive margin squeeze if the di¤erence between the retail prices charged by the dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services is negative, or insu¢ cient to cover the product-speci…c costs to the dominant operator of providing its own retail services on the downstream market").
Our goal in this paper is to model the equilibrium choice of distribution arrangement by an upstream, and possibly vertically integrated, …rm, the resulting market performance, and to model the impact of the transfer price rule on the choice of distribution mode and on market performance.
We outline our basic analytical framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we analyze the upstream …rm's equilibrium choice of distribution mode if it is not subject to the transfer price rule. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of the transfer price rule for the upstream …rm's equilibrium choice of distribution mode and for market performance. Section 5 concludes. Details of results are given in the Appendix; derivations are available from the authors on request.
Setup
We model a vertically-structured market in which one …rm, …rm A, is the monopoly supplier of an essential input for production of a …nal good. We suppose that one unit of the essential input is required to produce one unit of the …nal product, and that the essential input is produced at constant marginal cost, which, for simplicity, we normalize to be zero. We further assume that the downstream market is supplied by at most one nonintegrated …rm. Vertical price squeezes have been an issue in cases where the downstream market is a small-numbers oligopoly. By focusing on the limiting case of one downstream …rm, we avoid highlighting horizontal relationships among downstream …rms at the expense of the vertical relationships in which we wish to focus. 10
Sequence
There are at most three stages in the market (Figure 1 ). In stage I, …rm A chooses one of three distribution modes ( Figure 2 ). It may choose to fully internalize distribution, refusing to supply the downstream …rm with the essential input and so excluding the downstream …rm, …rm B, from the …nal good market. It may choose dual distribution, integrating downstream and competing with …rm B, to which it supplies the essential input at wholesale price ! B (where B is a demand parameter and a measure of product quality). The third distribution mode is nonintegration: …rm A operates only upstream, and supplies …nal demand using the distribution services of …rm B, which again purchases the essential input at wholesale price ! B and is the monopoly supplier to the …nal good market.
In stage II, which occurs only if …rm A opts for dual distribution or nonintegration, …rm A sets wholesale price ! B . 11 We assume that …rm B enters the 1 0 Carlton (2008) discusses (without formally presenting) a similar model. By allowing at most one independent downstream …rm, we also rule out "hold up" e¤ects in vertical relationships of the kind considered by Hart and Tirole (1990 downstream market if entry will allow it to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment.
Finally, in stage III, …rms that are active in the downstream market set prices to maximize own present-discounted value over all future time. If there is dual distribution, prices are set non-cooperatively. The game is solved backward.
Demand
If …rms A and B supply the downstream market, they do so with horizontallyand vertically-di¤erentiated varieties. We model downstream demand with the Spence-Dixit-Vives linear demand speci…cation. The inverse demand equation investment.
for variety i is 12 ;13
Here i is the maximum reservation price for variety i, which we interpret as a measure of quality. Equation (2) thus allows for vertical product di¤erentiation. This speci…cation can be derived from a discrete choice model in which each of N consumers, uniformly distributed by reservation price from 0 to i , purchases one unit of a variety if its price is less than the consumer's reservation price (Martin, 2009 ). In this model, N is a measure of market size. , which lies between zero and one, measures horizontal substitutability between the two varieties.
In what follows, we work with the demand equations implied by (2),
for …rm A and
is a measure of relative product quality and indicates the extent of vertical product di¤erentiation.
Cost
If …rm i enters the downstream market, it incurs a completely sunk entry cost E i (i = A; B) and a …xed cost F i per unit time period. It also incurs a constant marginal cost per unit of output for all inputs other than the essential input produced by …rm A. To highlight the impact of vertical input pricing, and for notational simplicity, we normalize marginal cost to be zero.
Alternative Distribution Regimes
We …rst consider …rm A's equilibrium choice of distribution mode, and resulting market performance, if the transfer price rule is not in place.
1 2 Henceforth, let it be understood that the subscripts i; j refer to i; j = A; B and i 6 = j. 1 3 Inverse demand equations of this form can be derived from a quadratic social welfare function
where N , the number of consumers, is a market size parameter, and H is a Hicksian numeraire good produced at unit cost under constant returns to scale. 
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Exclusion
If …rm A internalizes the distribution function, it sets price to maximize its present discounted value,
where interest rate r is used to discount future income. With …rm A the single supplier of the downstream market, the demand equation is
Firm A's value-maximizing output, price, and value are given in Table 1 , column 2, along with equilibrium consumer surplus (CS) and net social welfare (N SW , the sum of …rm value and consumer surplus). Note from Table 1 
Nonintegration
If …rm A operates only at the upstream level, …rm B supplies the downstream market and sets p B to maximize
with
denoting the quantity demanded when …rm B is the only supplier. In stage II, …rm A sets the wholesale price ! to maximize
The resulting wholesale price and other equilibrium characteristics are given in Table 1 , column 3.
Dual distribution

Stage III: Retail Prices
With dual distribution, …rms A and B compete as price-setting duopolists in stage III, the wholesale price ! having been set by …rm A in stage II. Firm A's objective function is the present value of the sum of its pro…t from sales of the …nal good and its pro…t from sales to …rm B of the essential input,
where q A (p A ; p B ) and q B (p A ; p B ) are the demand equations (3) and (4). Firm B's objective function is the present value of pro…t from its sales of the …nal good,
Stage III noncooperative equilibrium prices as functions of !, along with the corresponding quantities demanded, are given in the Appendix.
Stage II: Wholesale Price
In stage II, …rm A picks ! to solve
Two cases need to be considered, depending on whether the value of ! that maximizes …rm A's value does or does not leave …rm B with nonnegative value. We …rst consider the case in which the solution to (16) implies that …rm B's dual-distribution participation constraint, V dd2 B 0, is satis…ed. The value-maximizing wholesale price is
and falls as R rises. Thus, the greater is the relative quality of the nonintegrated …rm's variety, the more it is in …rm A's interest to increase the quantity demanded of the nonintegrated …rm, thereby raising derived demand for the essential input. Equilibrium outputs are
and
Firm A's duopoly output, (18), decreases as R rises, reaching zero for
From (19) it follows that R > is a condition for …rm B to have positive duopoly output.
Firm A's equilibrium value, V dd A , satis…es
(21) can be rewritten in two ways that are useful. First,
Thus …rm A's value rises as …rm B's equilibrium output rises, and rises more rapidly, the greater is the relative quality of …rm B's variety, R. On the one hand, ! and …rm A's own output both fall as R rises (see (17) and (18)). On the other hand, however, …rm B's output rises as R rises (see (19)), and …rm A sells one unit of the essential input to …rm B for every unit of output that …rm B sells. (21) shows that the latter e¤ect more than outweighs the …rst two. Alternatively, …rm A's duopoly value satis…es 
Although …rm B has positive duopoly output for R > , its duopoly value is nonnegative only if R takes the larger value
where we write
for notational compactness.
By (19) and (23), for R < R B , …rm A's dual distribution value would exceed its exclusion value, but …rm B would not accept to distribute its variety of the product at the wholesale price ! dd (equation (17)).
We can show that for values of R in the range R 1 R R B , where
…rm A enjoys greater value, compared with exclusion, by lowering ! enough to allow …rm B to break even under dual distribution. We refer to this regime as constrained dual distribution (cdd ). R 1 is the value of R at which …rm A's constrained dual-distribution value equals its exclusion value. The appropriate formulation of …rm A's constrained value-maximization problem is max
For R in this range, …rm B's participation constraint is binding, yielding the wholesale price
which is, as expected, smaller than ! dd . If …rm B's participation constraint is binding, …rm A's constrained dual distribution value satis…es
Equilibrium Choice of Distribution Mode
Firm A's dual distribution value satis…es (21). From Table 1 , its nonintegration value satis…es
If …rm B's participation constraint is not binding, so that (16) is …rm A's value-maximization problem, the di¤erence between …rm A's unconstrained dual-distribution value and its nonintegration value satis…es
We have assumed k A A < 1 4 (see (10)). For notational compactness, write
(33) and
A (that is, they are the values of R for which the right-hand side of (32) equals zero). It can be shown that R 1 < R B and R L < R AZ .
The relation between relative quality R and …rm A's value-maximizing distribution choice is of one of three types, depending on the magnitude of k A = A . The cases are summarized in Theorem 1. 
…rm A's value-maximizing distribution choices are
, once again dual distribution does not occur: …rm A's optimal strategy passes directly from exclusion to nonintegration at the value R = R XN at which …rm A's exclusion value equals its nonintegration value. These cases may occur for su¢ ciently close to 1. Theorem 1 holds for in the range where …rm 1 will opt for dual distribution for some values of R. 14 In Figure 4 we illustrate …rm A's choice of distribution mode for all .
Theorem 1L is illustrated in Figure 3 , for an intermediate value of . For low values of k A = A , …rm A maximizes its value by excluding …rm B for 0 R < R 1 . For R 1 R R B , …rm A maximizes value by setting its wholesale price ! so that …rm B just breaks even under dual distribution. 15 For R between R B and R AZ , …rm A maximizes its value by pricing the essential input at its unconstrained value, thereby allowing …rm B to realize positive value. For R = R AZ , A's dual-distribution output is zero; …rm A distributes solely through …rm B for R R AZ .
Note that there is a discontinuous drop in …rm A's value when it switches from dual distribution to nonintegration. For R su¢ ciently close to R AZ , the value of …rm A's downstream operation, arti…cially considered as a stand-alone 1 4 For near 1, it may also happen (as illustrated in Figure 4 ) that as R rises from low levels, …rm A's optimal distribution choice passes from exclusion to constrained dual distribution to dual distribution, back to exclusion, and then to nonintegration. Theorem 1 holds for values of below this range.
1 5 We make a "tie-breaking" assumption that if …rm B earns a normal rate of return on investment, it accepts to distribute the …nal good. . activity, is negative. 16 However, it is nonetheless value-maximizing for …rm A to operate at the downstream level as long as its output is positive: the presence of …rm A's variety on the downstream market limits the double-marginalization that a¤ects …rm B's output. 17 At R = R AZ , …rm A's dual-distribution drops to zero. For higher values of R, the full double-marginalization e¤ect kicks in, due to …rm A's nonintegration, and there is a discontinuous decline in …rm A's equilibrium value.
1 7 Discussing anticompetitive price squeezes -those that worsen market performance - Motta and de Streel (2006, p. 115 , footnote 59) discuss cross-subsidization of a retail division by the wholesale division of a vertically-integrated …rm. In our model, for R su¢ ciently close to R AZ , cross-subsidization is not only privately pro…table for the integrated …rm but also improves market performance, by limiting double marginalization. Nor does cross-subsidization make the nonintegrated …rm unpro…table; it makes the nonintegrated …rm less pro…table than would otherwise be the case, to the bene…t of consumers. Figure 4 : Firm A's choice of distribution mode, low k A , low k B , no transfer price rule. Figure 4 shows …rm A's value-maximizing choice of distribution mode in (R; )-space for the case of Theorem 1L. The range of values of R consistent with dual distribution narrows as varieties become closer substitutes. As noted above, for su¢ ciently close to 1, dual distribution is never …rm A's valuemaximizing choice.
R XN
Theorem 1H is illustrated in Figure 5 . For high values of k A = A , as for low, constrained dual distribution begins with R = R 1 , and unconstrained dual distribution begins with R = R B . As R rises from R B , dual distribution continues to be …rm A's value-maximizing choice until R reaches R L , the smaller of two values at which V dd
For high values of k A = A , …rm A opts out of dual distribution before its dual-distribution output goes to zero. 18 The is a narrow one. 19 Theorem 1M has in common with Theorem 1H that …rm A maximizes value by internalizing distribution for 0 R < R 1 and opts for dual distribution as R rises above R L . But for intermediate values of k A = A , R H , the larger of the two values at which V dd A = V ni A , is less than R AZ . For R in the range R H R < R AZ , …rm A once again maximizes value with dual distribution. Theorem 1M has in common with Theorem 1L that as R approaches R AZ , …rm A loses value on its downstream operation if the downstream operation is viewed as a stand-alone operation, but it is value-maximizing for the …rm as a whole to participate in the downstream market to mitigate double-marginalization by …rm B. (1 2 )(1+ 2 ) 2 (8+ 2 ) 7+ 2 . This length ‡uctuates between 1.5 and 2 per cent of 1=4 for approximately the range 0 0:7, and falls rapidly to zero for larger values of .
Discussion
Note that we consider a situation in which all …rms make entry decisions de novo. Firm B makes its entry decision only after …rm A has announced its wholesale price. Contrast this with the case of a deus ex machina increase in the quality of …rm A's variety (a reduction in R), after …rm B has committed sunk assets, and assume there is unconstrained dual distribution. Such a shift would result in an increase in the unconstrained wholesale price ! dd , in decreases in p A , p B , and in a decrease in …rm B's margin over variable cost, p B ! B . 20 Firm B's margin over variable cost might remain su¢ cient to cover its average …xed cost but not the average capitalized value of sunk entry cost. Such a change would appear to the owners of …rm B to be a vertical price squeeze; from an economic point of view, it would be more a stranded asset problem. 21 A su¢ ciently great reduction in R might make …rm A switch to constrained dual distribution or even to exclusion. In the latter case, this change, although nonstrategic, might well reduce consumer welfare (it would certainly reduce consumer choice, from two varieties to one). We therefore turn to the transfer price rule and its impact on market performance.
The transfer price rule
In what follows, we focus on values of k A A for which Theorem 1L holds, so that in the absence of the transfer price rule, …rm A would opt for constrained or unconstrained dual distribution for R 1 R R AZ . The transfer price rule requires that …rm A's downstream operation should realize a nonnegative pseudo-pro…t in the counterfactual case that it has to purchase the essential input on the same terms as …rm B, that is
with duo = dd; cdd, or equivalently that
where b V AD is the pseudo-value of …rm A's downstream operation, before allowing for capital cost.
When would the TPR be a binding constraint?
We …rst ask for what values of R, , and k A A the transfer price rule would be a binding constraint. Considering …rst the unconstrained dual distribution regime, this requires us to analyze the gross pseudo-value function of …rm A's downstream operation,
The TPR is a binding constraint if
and the equality version of (41) is a cubic equation in R.
From (40), it appears that b V AD = 0 for two positive values of R, i.e., R = and R = R AZ . We can moreover show that b V AD rises from 0 at R = , attains a maximum for a value R that lies between and R AZ , and declines for larger values of R. 22 We can identify this value R and write the analytical expression for the maximum value b V AD of …rm A's gross downstream pseudo-value.
the TPR is a binding constraint for all R that satisfy the condition of Theorem 1L. In what follows, we consider values of k A A that satisfy (42). 23 The lower bound of the unconstrained dual distribution range is R = R B , not R = . We have discussed R = because it is a root of b V AD = 0. For R < R B , the value of the wholesale price used to de…ne the pseudo-value of …rm A's downstream operation is the constrained optimal value, ! cdd , not ! dd . As R falls below R B , the relative quality of …rm A's variety increases, and the pseudo-pro…t of …rm A's downstream division rises.
When there is constrained dual distribution, the transfer price rule is a binding constraint for R cT < R < R B . 24 For R < R cT , the relative quality of …rm A's variety is su¢ ciently great that the transfer price rule ceases to be a binding constraint (that is, (41) does not hold).
, then the horizontal line at height k A A cuts this function at two values of R, R bL and R bH . The TPR would be a binding constraint over the ranges R R bL and R bH R R AZ . R bL and R bH are roots of a cubic equation. We limit attention to values of k A A for which the TPR would bind throughout the relevant range of R on the argument that if we understand how the TPR would a¤ect market performance if it is a binding constraint over the entire range of R, then we will understand how it a¤ects market performance when it is a binding constraint over only a subset of the relevant range of R.
If the TPR is a binding constraint
If the TPR is a binding constraint, …rm A will set ! and p A so that the constraint holds with equality,
To do otherwise would involve a needless sacri…ce of value. Substituting for stage III values of p A A and q A N as functions of ! in (43) yields a quadratic equation that determines the TPR-constrained value of !. Given this value ! T P R , all stage III quantities of interest are determined.
The TPR obliges …rm A to set a price p A and wholesale price per unit of quality ! so that its downstream operation breaks even in the counterfactual, pseudo-value sense. Although the TPR forces …rm A to act as if its downstream operation pays ! A per unit of the essential input, …rm A still bases its distribution choice on its actual (but TPR-constrained) dual-distribution value. Thus one should expect that the imposition of the TPR will change the values of R at which …rm A's optimal distribution option will shift from exclusion to dual distribution to nonintegration. 25 ;26 Figure 6 shows …rm A's value-maximizing choice of distribution mode in (R; )-space, if …rm A is subject to the TPR. The regions in which …rm A would opt for alternative distribution modes have the general con…guration of the no-TPR regime (Figure 4 ). If the TPR is in place, the transition from the range of Rs where …rm B's participation constraint is binding to the region in which …rm B's participation constraint is not binding and the transition from dual distribution to nonintegration take place at lower values of R than when there is no TPR, for a given value of . With the TPR, the dual distribution region ends at a lower level of than without the TPR.
Numerical analysis
There are no analytical solutions if the TPR is a binding constraint. We illustrate the consequences of the TPR for parameter values 27 that are central in 2 5 In its 1967 Schwinn decision (U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. et al. 388 U.S. 365 (1967) ), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Schwinn could not impose nonprice restraints on independent distributors that had taken title to bicycles intended for resale. Following this decision, Schwinn internalized the distribution function, cutting o¤ distributors with which it had had decades-long relationships.
2 6 EU competition policy holds that a dominant …rm cannot deny an existing customer normal supplies merely because the dominant …rm decides to enter a downstream market (Commercial Solvents (Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223.)). But GlaxoSmithKline/Spain (Glaxo-SmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission Case C 501/06 P 17 December 2008) contains a recognition that it is not useful to place a …rm, even a dominant …rm, in a situation where its options are to lose money or to withdraw from a market entirely. The implications of these precedents, as is or in combination with the TPR, for distribution choices by dominant …rms under EU competition policy, are unclear. the sense that for these values, …rm A will opt for exclusion, dual distribution, or nonintegration, depending on R. We examine the consequences of the TPR for …rm A's choice of distribution mode and for market performance. We also discuss qualitative changes in the results for other sets of parameter values. Figures (7)-(9) show the impact of the TPR on …rm values, on wholesale and retail prices, and on consumer surplus and net social welfare, 28 respectively. For each variable, the …gures show the TPR-constrained value as a fraction of the corresponding no-TPR value.
Low k A , k B
For these parameter values, the TPR is a binding constraint for R cT R R AZ . For R < R cT , the relative quality of …rm A's variety is so great that its downstream unit would have a positive pseudo-value at ! = ! cdd . At the other extreme, for R R AZ , …rm A would opt for nonintegration in any case, since its dual-distribution output is zero. As shown in Figure 7 (a), the TPR reduces …rm A's value for all R cT R R AZ . When the TPR is imposed, …rm A chooses dual distribution for R cT R R dn , where R dn is the relative quality level at which …rm A switches from dual distribution to nonintegration if it is subject to the TPR. 29 Without the TPR, however, …rm A would choose dual distribution subject to …rm B's participation constraint for R cT R R B , and would choose dual distribution for R B R R AZ . For R dn < R AZ , …rm A would choose nonintegration if subject to the TPR but dual distribution without the TPR. The imposition of the TPR changes …rm A's incentives and induces it to withdraw from distribution at a lower relative quality level than is the case without the TPR.
Correspondingly, the TPR increases …rm B's relative value for all R cT < R R dn and for much of the range R dn R R AZ . 30 For low levels of R in that range, the absolute level of …rm B's value (with or without the TPR) 2 9 R dn must be solved for numerically. See the discussion in the Appendix that is available on request from the authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is small, but the relative increase in …rm B's value under the TPR is large. As long as …rm A …nds it optimal to integrate forward, the TPR further increases …rm B's value. If …rm A does not integrate forward, it sets a relatively high !, 31 and …rm B's value is essentially what it would be without the TPR (the ratio shown in Figure 7 (b) is near 1). Underlying the value changes shown in Figure 7 are the changes in !, p A , and p B shown in Figure 8 . As long as …rm A integrates forward, the TPR obliges it to lower the price of …rm B's essential input. It is to be expected that where ! leads, p B follows, and this is indeed the case. As is also to be expected in price-setting duopoly, as the equilibrium value of p B falls, the equilibrium value of p A falls as well. But if the TPR induces …rm A to withdraw from distribution, there are modest relative increases in both ! and p B .
The changes in relative consumer surplus and relative net social welfare shown in Figure 9 mirror the price changes shown in Figure 8 . If the TPR is in place, for values of R for which dual distribution is …rm A's value-maximizing choice, the TPR substantially increases consumer surplus, and increases net social welfare as well. For values of R that induce …rm A not to integrate into distribution under the TPR, the TPR signi…cantly reduces consumer surplus, and reduces net social welfare as well. Assessment To cast these results in the light most favorable to the transfer price rule, one might argue that one should expect values of R modestly greater than 1 -a local supplier is probably more in tune with the local market than would be a division of an integrated (perhaps multinational) …rm -but not substantially so. For the simulations discussed above, R cT is slightly smaller than 1, R B slightly more than 1, and R dn slightly larger than 2. R in the neighborhood of 2 implies B is roughly 4 times A . Probably one would not expect the maximum reservation price for a local variety to be more than four times the maximum reservation price of the variety of an integrated …rm. If this expectation is valid, the transfer price rule would have a moderate positive e¤ect on consumer surplus and on net social welfare. Evidently, however, this argument is conditional on …rm A integrating into distribution if subject to the transfer price rule. If, under the in ‡uence of the TPR, …rm A does not integrate into distribution, double marginalization implies a worsening of market performance. We turn, therefore, to discussion of the impact of the transfer price rule for other sets of parameter values, in particular larger ks.
Robustness
The transfer price rule requires …rm A to set ! and p A in such a way that its downstream unit would at least break even as a stand-alone entity paying the same wholesale price per unit of quality as …rm B. The downstream …rm's revenue must cover its …xed cost and a normal rate of return on its sunk entry cost. It is not surprising, therefore, that simulation results are sensitive to the value chosen for k A , …rm A's …xed cost and normal return on entry cost per capital. Holding other parameter values …xed (including k A = 1=40) and making k B four times as large as k A (that is, k B = 1=10, near the maximum value consistent with constraints) does not change the qualitative nature of the results. If the TPR is imposed, for su¢ ciently low values of R (R cT < R < R dn ), …rm A opts for dual distribution with ! set at its TPR-constrained value. For R in this range, …rm A's value is reduced. All other welfare elements, including net social welfare, increase. But the TPR induces …rm A to opt for nonintegration at a much lower level of R than would otherwise be the case (indeed, R dn < R AZ ). If …rm A is not integrated into distribution, double marginalization has a negative impact on both consumer surplus and on net social welfare.
If, in contrast, k B (= 1=40) and all other parameters are held at the values of Section 4.3.1, but if k A is made four times as large as k B (that is, 1=10), then …rm A, if subject to the TPR, never maximizes value with dual distribution. It excludes …rm B for all values of R for which there would be constrained dual distribution, and for part of the range of R for which there would be unconstrained dual distribution, without the TPR. Due to the imposition of the TPR, nonintegration is …rm A's value-maximizing choice at a much lower relative quality level than would otherwise be the case.
When the TPR induces …rm A to exclude, …rm A's value, consumer surplus, and net social welfare are all reduced. 32 For higher R, but well within the range of R that would result in dual distribution without the TPR, …rm A maximizes value by nonintegration if subject to the TPR. This increases …rm B's value, relative to the situation without the TPR, but reduces …rm A's value, consumer surplus, and net social welfare.
If k A and k B are both increased by a factor of four (that is, k A = k B = 1=10), holding other parameter values at previous levels, results are qualitatively the same as if k A alone is at the higher level (k A = 1=40, k B = 1=10).
In short, positive arguments for the TPR can be made, if the quality of …rm B's variety is only moderately greater than the quality of …rm A's variety and …rm A has relatively low …xed cost and sunk entry cost. However, the impact of the TPR on market performance is entirely negative if …rm A has high …xed cost and sunk entry cost, relative to the size of the market. In such cases, the e¤ect of the TPR is to short-circuit competition. For low R, only …rm A's variety is available to …nal consumers while only …rm B's variety, admittedly of higher quality, is available to …nal consumers. But double marginalization makes …rm B's variety available on terms that leave consumers worse o¤ than would be the case absent the TPR.
Conclusion
Economics
What we see is that the transfer price rule improves market performance as long as …rm A remains in the downstream market. If …rm A does not integrate forward into distribution, the transfer price rule worsens market performance, for values of R for which …rm A would opt for dual distribution, without the TPR but for nonintegration with the TPR. These results are consistent with empirical evidence (Lafontaine and Slade, 2005, p. 21) :
While di¤erent theoretical models often yield diametrically opposed predictions as to the welfare e¤ects of vertical restraints, we …nd that in the setting that we focus on, namely manufacturer/retailer or franchisor/franchisee relationships, the empirical evidence concerning the e¤ects of vertical restraints on consumer well-being is surprisingly consistent. Speci…cally, it appears that when manufacturers choose to impose such restraints, not only do they make themselves better o¤, but they also typically allow consumers to bene…t from higher quality products and better service provision.
Policy implications
The words of Section 2 of the Sherman Act refer to monopolization. The life that judicial interpretation has breathed into this clay deals with conduct that is exclusionary. The Article 102 EU Treaty prohibition of abuse of a dominant position is more complex, touching on exclusionary conduct but also on the exercise of market power and evincing a special responsibility of dominant …rms to conduct themselves in such a way that competition in the single market is not distorted.
The question of the appropriate antitrust treatment of vertical pricing is intimately related to the evolution of antitrust policy from reliance on competition tout court to get good market performance 33 to an explicit evaluation of the impact of business practices on market performance in general and consumer welfare in particular.
Here the implications of our model are ambiguous, in the following sense. For some parameter values, the TPR improves market performance (consumer surplus and net social welfare) by altering the terms of competition (rivalry) between integrated and nonintegrated …rms. This would suggest imposing the TPR as a means of promoting competition. But for other parameter values, imposing the TPR worsens market performance, either by inducing the upstream …rm to withdraw from distribution or by inducing the upstream …rm to internalize distribution, in both cases reducing competition in the sense of rivalry.
The tension here is that "competition" will sometimes improve market performance and sometimes worsen it, but explicit evaluation of the welfare impact of the transfer price rule on market performance in particular circumstances would seem, as a practical matter, to be beyond the competence of courts to carry out.
For U.S. antitrust policy, a suggested resolution of the tension between reliance on competition and explicit evaluation of the impact of (in this case) the TPR on market performance may be found in Posner's (2001, pp. 194-195) view that the proper target of Section 2 is business conduct that would exclude equally e¢ cient competitors. In this perspective, a vertically-integrated …rm that sells an essential input to nonintegrated downstream …rms with which it also competes is more e¢ cient than those downstream …rms because it is vertically integrated. 34 It may be that because the integrated …rm has a cost/quality advantage vis-à-vis its nonintegrated downstream customer/rival, it is pro…table for it to set a wholesale price that makes the downstream …rm unpro…table. But the pro…tability of such a wholesale price is not strategic in the sense of being conditional on the exit of the downstream rival.
In the absence of exclusionary behavior upstream, the upstream market will reach an equilibrium market structure dictated by the size of the upstream market and nature the upstream technology. If that equilibrium market structure is a monopoly (which may well be the case for the telecommunications markets that have been home to recent price squeeze complaints) that may be an argument for regulation. 35 It is not, or at least, our model does not make it, an argument for altering the terms of rivalry between integrated and nonintegrated …rms when the implications of such alteration for market performance can be seen only through a glass darkly. 36
Appendix
Here we state results. Derivations are given in a separate appendix available on request from the authors.
Table 1
Column 1 of Table 1 is the monopoly outcome, with demand determined by the quality of …rm A's variety. Column 2 is the double marginalization outcome, with demand determined by the quality of …rm B's variety.
Dual distribution
Inverse demands are given by equation (2) 
Where the …rst-order conditions hold, quantities demanded are (55)
!
The …rst-order condition to maximize V dd2 gives …rm A's optimal wholesale price, (17). Substituting (17) 
Transfer Price Rule
The transfer price rule requires that …rm A's downstream unit make a nonnegative pseudo-pro…t in the counterfactual case that it purchases the essential input at the same price as …rm B. The transfer price rule is a binding constraint if
where the left-hand side is evaluated for unconstrained equilibrium values. Equilibrium values satisfy 
The range of relative qualities consistent with dual distribution di¤ers as 
If this condition is not met, …rm A's equilibrium distribution choice as R rises switches directly from refusal to deal to nonintegration. Assume (66) holds, and consider the left-hand side of (64) over the maximum possible range of R, R + 1 2 2 + 8 6 :
The left-hand-side of (64) is zero for R = (since R = makes p A c A A ! A A = 0), and zero for R = + (1 2 )( 2 +8) 6 (since this value of R makes q A N = 0). The …rst derivative of the left-hand side of (64) is positive for R = and negative for R = + (1 2 )( 2 +8)
6
. The second derivative of the left-hand side of (64) is negative. Over the relevant range of R, the left-hand side of (64) thus begins at zero, rises to a maximum, and falls to zero again, taking a single maximum value. If this maximum value is less than k A A , the transfer price rule is a binding constraint for all R. If this maximum value is greater than k A A , the transfer price rule is binding for large values of R, and possibly for low values of R, depending on the di¤erence between R B and . Consideration of numerical examples shows that all cases can occur.
Large k A A
The lower limit of the relevant range of R is the same for the large- (68) Graphical analysis and evaluation of the left-hand-side of (68) for 0 1 and 0:25 R 2 shows that this condition is always met. The transfer price rule is always a binding constraint for large k A A . 7 References
